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The Secra Memorandum of 
Tanaka, Premier of Japan 
Witb an In*~on. 
Rspmrt~d from #be 
"COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL" 
WORKERS LIBRARY PUBUSHERS 
P.O. Box 148, Station D, New York 
HI 
" l n order to conquer the world we must first 
conquer China . . . With all the resources of 
Chino at our disposal we shall pass forward to thp 
conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, 
Central Asia and even Europe." 
l ' k p  la$mese Premik r . 
JAPANESE IMPERIALISM STRIPPED 
(Concerning the Tanaka Memorandum). 
E print M o w  the memorandum handed to the J a p e s e  
Emperor on July 25, 1927, by the Japanese Prime Minis&, 
M. Tanaka. All the workers of the world who stand in 
defence of the Soviet Union shu ld  know this h u m e a t .  The 
workers and peasants of thc calonies and semi-roloaies should 
know it. In particular the workers and peasants of China, Mom- 
golia, Manchuria and Korea &odd be acquaintad with if. 
W e  are seldom given the opportunity of examining the most 
secret, intimate documents of imperialists heading the Govem- 
ment of a "Great Powers'--documents in whicb the Government 
throws off its mask and with suave candour lays all the rapacious 
programme and methods of action of its Govetnment before the 
head of the State. 
The document is interesting because it gives us the key to an 
understanding of all that is gang on at present on the Manchurian 
plains aad gives authoritative confirnation of how near is inter- 
vention against the Soviet Union. I t  is interesting in that it 
shows up the unbounded, militarist plans of rapahus Japanese 
imperiaIisrn which is threatening us with a new world imperialist 
war. The dmument is interesting beeause it gives a shamefully 
bare-faced description of all the methods of bloody violence, 
robbery, oppression, lies, deceit and cunning used by impridism 
to gain its own ends. It is interesting, again, because it shows 
how the imperialists are prepared now to rob wen those whom 
they had, m the beginning, deceived into being the catspaw for 
carrying out their offensive, those whom they look upon as the 
"vanguard" of this offensive (in the present case-the Koreans). 
Finally, the document is interesting in that it  wholeheartedly 
dedareqthat all this policy which it describes itseIf as a policy of 
violence, robbery and deceit has as its aim the "conso1idation of 
Far East" 1 ! (page 16). 
\ 
our national defence in the interests of peace and order in the 
Jn what way does Japanese imperialism, in accordance with this 
memorandum, intend to act "in the interests of peace and order 
in the Far East"? 
As regards the U.S.S.R., Japan's "peace policy" is thc 
"If the Chinese-Eastern Railway belonging to Soviet Russia 
develops in this district, then our new continental policy will 
receive a blow which will inevitably bring about conflict with 
Soviet Russia in the near future. In this case we shall again be 
obliged to play the rdle ws played in the Rwso-Japanese War. 
, The Chinese-Eastem Railway d l  become ours just as the 
South6m-Manchurian railmy became ours, and we shall seize 
3 - 
Kirin a8 we seized Dairen. I t  seems that the iilwitabiity of 
crossing swords with Russis on the fields of Mongolia in order 
to gain possession of the Walth of North Manchuria is part of 
our programme of national development" @ e 18). "If we 
I d  into the future we must admit the i~zsvitab 5i ly of mar with 
Russia on the fields of North Manchu&'' (page 19). "Having 1 
constructed this line, we can convert Dala~ into a base for the 
ofFensive against Siberia dong three roads: through Tu-, 
Andan and Tsitsikar. The nches of North Manchuria will fall 1 into our hands" (pap ao): "Manchuria and Mongolia, 
Eastern countries wh~ch are at111 absolutely undeveloped. Sooner 
or later we shall have to fight here against Soviet Russia. The - 
fight will take phee in Girin" (page as). 
In these statements it is interesting to note that Japanese im- 
pWsm compares the mming war against the rwolutipnary 
Soviet Rqublim, which day by day graw stronger and stronger, 
with tbe last war against the Twist monarchy which was entirely 4 
rotten to the core. The Japanese imperialists have already tried 
the feebleness of the weapons of the Tsarisr army, which shed its 
b l d  in Manchurh, on foreign territory for the sake of the 
rapacious aim8 of Tsarism ; but t h y  have not yet experienced the 
force of arms of the Red Army which, standig by the policy of 
the Soviet Government, will not 6ght for purposes d conquest but 
which, should Japanese hordes invade the remto of the Soviet 2 Union, will stoutly defend the Iaad, without yid 'ng an inch of 
-ground, The fact that the Japnese do not understand the 
fundamental difference between the Tsarist Army and the Red 
Army will, of course, only increase their determination to mala 
inteweotioo . 
As regards the United States of America, Japanese imperialism 
describes its "policy of pace" in the memorandum as follows :- 
"In the infr7ests of ss l f -cbf~e  and the &few% af o t k s  ( I) 
Japan cannot remove the di&uIties in Eastern Asia, witbout 
pursuing a polic of 'blood and iron.' But in pursuing this 
policy we shall b brought up face. to face with the United 
States, who are directed towards us by the Chinew @icy d 
3ghthg again& poison with the help of poison. If we wish, 
in future, to gain control wer Cbina, we must m k  tb United 
States, i.e., befaat18 tomardo the Stated as ~ lnr  did duAng the 
Russo-Japanese Was. In order to conquer Cbina, we must first 
conquer Manchuria and Mongolia" (page r I ) .  
Here, again, Japanese imperialism, under the hypnosis of 
Japan's dd victory over the Tsarist Army, compares the futiue 
m r  against the United States with the old Russo-Japanese war. 
And this illusion only increases the reality of the future war 
between Japan and the United States. 
Therefore the strategic plan of Japanese imperialism amounts 
b this : First, seize Manchuria and Mongolia and make'interven- 
ordermtheFar EasL" 
. . W e  waiting to see haw Japanese imperlahn will in the f u m  
.&quer the whole of Asia and "men Europe," we might £or 
4me being note the fact as to how Japanese . i m p c r i a ~  in x.gw 
ieteaded to act in I 31 fwd haw it h s  begun to act M y )  in
i f  . Chiaa, Mancburh, ongoPa and Korea In this respect W 
memomdurn is particularly Interethg. If as regads future 
s t s  the au@er J the memorandum sari be called a day- 
dreaming, imperial'i Dm Quixote, when the question conems 
uar pefspemws connectad with the a h r e  of Manchuria and 
Mongolia and the war against the U.S,S.&, he gives a well 
&ought out, caaerete* militiy and strategi* a~~samic and 
af attark, which Japan bas already begun ta put 
As regards China, Jupa- imperialism sbwa the same aom- 
 pet^ absence of any understanding of, an8 compWy 
pores, the forces of rwolurion, as m s  the c u e  itl the attitude 
tuwards the U.S. S. R. The meanorandurn was dram up In r 7, 
is+ whe. the wave ad rewlution had already swept tha SouCof 
,aka. ~emrthe iess  memoriaad- refer= to the awakening 
af China ,mlg as a 'Wgq. Evt we are sot at .t them* 
' irrtcrested in tlre b W  o o n d b . d  the iPlperklist, but in the q e  
tign as.tQ haw these impdalbt ",uvilisarsp' b h v e  towards the 
d m n g  peoples. The memorarrdum runs thus:- 
order to be able on the 
5 
. . , r - .  u 
rnent intended exclusively for the Japanese Emperor, expIaintd 
how Japanese imperialism intends defending their "independence. " 
"Manchuria and Mongolia are the '~el~iums* if the Far 
East. During the Great War Belgium was made the battle- 
field. fn our -7s with Rwsk and the United States, me must 
insist u p a ~  Manchuriq and Moagolia bearing all: the horrors of 
mar. As it is clear that we shall have to violate the neutrality 
of thew territor5es, we must at alI cosu construct the Ginn- 
Hoiren and the Chan-Chun-Dalai milways . . , '' (page 23). 
The memorandum, however, is not limited to the sutement that 
Japanex imperialism will be wmpelled to violate the neutrality 
of Mongolia and Manchuria and corn* them to "experience all 
the horrors of war." I t  describes wrth shameless sincerity how 
Japanese imperiaIisrn having gained control of Mongolia, will rob 
its toiIin masses :- 
" d m  there will be enough of mr people in inner and Outer 
Mongolia, 108 shall buy up the land, paying for it om-tenth 
. purf of its tmr value, and begin to grow rice there in' order to 
increase our s t w k  of fm&t&s. . . . When w have a hrp8 
section of the- lad in our hands, thsrd i l l  no Iongev be any 
question us to whslk~r Mongolia belongs to the apaness or to 
the Mongolians. Backed up by our military 4 ores, we can 
rearise our pvsitit~e ( I )  policy. In order to achieve this plan, 
one million yens must be assigned from the 'secret fund of the 
war ministry' and 400 retired officers must be sent to Inner and 
Outer Monmlia. These offie8~s, dressed as Chinese &%ens and 
adkg as fsachsrs, mwt Ejvr among the p + h t i o n  and ggn 
the conwencs of the Mmgolbro princes a d  so on" (page r5). 
Japanese imperialism not only intended, and is int&&g, -to 
rob the Mongolians by deceiving them. Japamese imperialism 
uses the same tactic of deceit and oonsequent robbery towards the 
Koreanfi, whom it wishes to use as i ts  catspaw for military pur- 
poses in China :- 
"As a result of the freedom which they (the Koreans) enjoy 
in Manchuria, thanks to the imperfect police system (apparently 
perfection is not compatible with freedom according to the 
imperialists.-Ed.), and also owing to the wealth of the land, 
no fewer than one mllion Koreans are to be found in the three 
' Eastern provinces, . . . They cmmt be compared with the 
. naturalised Japanese in California, and South America. They 
have merely become Chinese temporarily. When their number 
, reaches two-and-a-half millions and more, it wiU be possBl& to 
incite them, in case of rrscessity, to military actwn atrd ws 
s h d  support them, aswritng ihem that m are su#+~essing the 
Korean movment" (page ~ 5 ) .  
This is similar to what the English are doing in f n d i ,  Persk 
land Afghanistan, ete., to what France is domg in her colonies, 
and the U.S.A. in Latin Amerim I The memorandum furthe 

mne~aeoa, the Japanese imperialist Tmaka offers unbounded 
P ~ ~ = *  
"In inviting other Powers to take part in the development 
d the South Manchurian Railway, we am deceive the urhaIe 
w l d  ( ! 1 ) .  Having done this we can move forward into Man- 
churia and Mongolia, etc" (page 3x1. 
Tbis gives one nn idea of the imperialit "civilisers," when 
they bare and rumask themselves before their chief, behind the 
wcLncs. 
'I'hr Tanaka memorandum is of enormous interest and should 
be given wide circulation among the proletarians and peasants of 
the whole world ; not only because it is of actual sign%cance now, 
being an , undisputed codmation of the fact that Japanesa 
imperialism is making direct prepmtions for intwvention against 
ttie. U.S.S.R. and against the Chinese revolution, but because it 
throws P strong light upon the basis of imperialist policy as a 
whole. The Tanaka memorandum is a true text-book d imperial- 
ism. The rapacious ends served and the cunning means used, 
according to the Tanaka memorandum by Japanese imperialism, 
are curnmon to tbe imperialism of dl the "Great Powers." Whm 
we are given the opportunity of reading the secret memoranda 
ot any Prime Minister to his King, or to the President of the 
Republic, we may be sure that they will be as alike as two peas 
to the Taaaka memorandum. The proletariat of every capitalist 
country should rheiefore learn the nature of their ollm national 
imperialism from the example of the Tanaka memorandum until 
such time as they, having achieved tbeir own October, will 
be able to read the memoranda of their own late Ministers in their 
own Soviet State archives. But this memorandum must be read 
by the prol4tatia t of all countries not only for the purpose of 
studying the nature of imperklimt. It should muse them u to 
and deceit which is  called impddism, dull be swept away. 
E basten on the moment when the whole system of violence, rob ery 
MEMORANDUM ON THE POSITIVE POLICY IN MAN- 
CHURIA, PRESENTBD TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN ON 
JULY as, rga7, BY THE PRIME MINISTER, M. TAMAKA. 
Since the European war Japanese political and economic 
interests have been in an irregular state. Tbis is due to the fact 
that we were not able to make use of our special privifeges in 
Manchuriu and Mongolia and entiitfly realise the righrs we had 
gained. When I was appointed Prime Minister, I was particu- 
larly instructed to defend our interests in this sphere and to lose 
no opportunities for further expansion. Tasks of this sort cannot 
be considered IightIy. Since I, in my capacity of a simple citizen, 
have been in favour of a positive policy ia regard to Manchuria 
and Mongolia, I have been c o n s ~ t l y  eodemrvaddg to put this 
W B L B .  
Mambuia and Mmgolia include the Fengiieb, Kitin aad Rd 
Lwng-kbg provinces aad h e r  and Outer Mongolk The ;#bole 
of this covers 7+= sqwtre miles with a ppalatim of 
millh.  This territory is awr three tima as hrge as that d our 
own Empire without Korea and Formosa, altbugh'the papub 
&XI is t h e  times d l w  than ours. The counw is an attru&on 
lmot only -use of the sparsity of the pqmIatioa : nowhere in the 
world can .there be fomd such rlctr fomsts, such a wealth d 
mineral resaurocs and agrhltnd prodarch T h d  South 84- 
chub Rdvpy QQmwp was specidly created for the purpose 
of Moithg these riches and m w s i n g  our national glorp. 
h r d b g  to p b  which should be equally advantagerpus b t h  
for aim and for Japaa, we bested no 1- thrrn 440 d i u n  yens 
ia ous. dmysI epping, forestry, steal, agricultural and cattle- 
b tQed i  uadertalrings. This, d&ut  doubt, is our b i g p ~  
besment and strongest mgdsation. klthwgh tbis udmtk-  
fng b nominally in tdte callectivc posseslorn of the Eolr4rarseat and 
t h e m ,  d y  it L e a ~ y i n t h s ~ d s o f  theWvemmen1 
h so far US the South Manchuria Raiiway Company is eqmwed  
with diplomatic, police md ordinary admhistrative f m d o m ~  fat 
thc purpose of pu* tbrotlgb our imperial policy, it is a 5 p d d  
orgarhion which h exactly tbe same rights as the Koran 
G a v e m b ~ ~ d  fact dona @s af the enormous 
whkh we tyive in ~ ~ u &  and Ma+ The pn@ 
being pimud t ~ m t d s  this tountry has ken pursued skce the 
t h e  of Em-r Medji, om the W s  d his btrwtbm and is 
bkging b u t  the devthpmmt of oi new c~ntheutd Em* 
whiGh is WWW for the further devebpmeat of mu wdod 
glory and the prosperitp d innumerable future generati- 
Unfommateiy, s h e  the Europeaa war thtm have ken m-t 
changes in home and foreign The powers of the thtae 
Eustern pmvhes hve alsd alert and, fo-sg. ,om 
example, are making &orb3 at remnstru&on and indus- - 
development. Wa have to admit &at there have been astpundkg 
sucmwes which haw most seriously hindered the p W h ,  d ow 
fdm. h p h d  us in an UaEaveblcposi-md 
wt ia tbs  with the, cnnsbntry c h @ g  Gwcmmmb of Idam-. 
' 
' &urh and .Mongolia have been ~u~~ h d r *  Sb, ,; 
Nine Powers Agwement, signed at the Washington Conference, 
limited our specid rigbts and privileges, to such an extent that 
we lost all freedom there. Our country's very existence is 
threatened. 
If these obstacles are not removed, there will, be no safeguard 
for our national existence, and our national power will not develop. 
Moreover, sources of wealth are concentrated in Nortb Manchuria. 
If we are going to have no right to penetrate into Northern Man- 
churia, it is dear that we cannot lay hands upon the wealth of that 
country. Even the resources of South Manchuria, which we 
gained during thc Russo-Japanese war, are severel limited by 
the agreement of the Nine Powers, As a result, w d  our people 
wnnot f d y  settle in Manchuria,' the Chinese are settling there 
in huge numbers. Hordes of Chinese arrive each year in the three 
Eastera provinces and they number millions, They so menace 
our rights in Manchuria and Mongalia, that our annual surplus 
population which is wer  &o,ooo persons can 6nd no refuge far 
themselves there. In view of this we have to conless our failure 
in the attempts made to establish equilibrium between the size of 
our population and our fmd supplies. If steps are not taken to 
stop the influx of Chinese immediately, their number at the end 
of five years will exceed six mution and we shall then be faced with 
much bigger difficulties, in M d u r i a  and Mongolia. 
It must be borne in mind that when the Nine Powers A p  
ment was signed, which limited our freedom of movement in Man- 
churia and Mongolia, public opinion was seriously disturbed. The 
late Emperor Taischo called a conference at which Yamagata and 
other high officials of the army and the fleet were present, to 
discuss ways and means of fighting against this new obligation. 
I was sent to Europe and America unofficially to obtain informa- 
tion concerning the attitude of important smhsrnen on this que* * 
tion. They dl considered that the agreement between the Great 
Powers was concluded upon t L  initiagve of the United States of 
America. The other Powers who signed the agreement hcl 
nothing against the grawth af our influence in Manchuria and 
Mongolia, provided we remain in a position to defend our interests 
in international trade and international Investments. Declarations 
to this effect were made to me privately by plitical leaders in 
England, Fmce and Italy, Unfortunately, just as we were about 
to put through our policy and, with the consent: of those whom I 
had interviewed during my journey, to declare the Nine Powers 
Agreement invalid, the Seiyukan Cabinet suddenly came to an end, 
and our policy could not be put though. W e  regret this very 
strongly. Having exchanged opinions with the Powers about the 
develo ment of Manchuria and Mongolia, I t r a v W  back through 
Shang E ai. In Shanghai a Chinaman made an attempt upan my 
life. An American woman was wounded, but I ,  tbmks to the 
providential assistance extended to me by the spirits of my dead 
Em-, was saved. I t  is obvious that sacred Providence wishes 
me lo help Your Imperial Majesty to open up a new era in the Far 
East and to develop our continental Empire. 
The three Eastern provinces in the political sense are an imp* 
fect stain upon the Far East. In the interests of self-defence md 
the defence of others, Japan cmaot  remove the dilExlties in. 
Eastern Asia, without pursuing a policy of "blood and iron." But 
in pursuing t h ~ s  policy we shall be brougbt up face to face with 
the United States, who are directed towards us by the Cbinese 
policy of fighting against poison with the help of poison. If we 
wish, in future, to gain control over China, we must crush the 
United States, i.e., behave towards the United States as we 
did during' the Russo-Japanese war. In order to wnquef 
China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. 
In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. Lf 
we are able to conquer China, all the other Asiatic countries and 
the countries of the South Seas wit1 fear us and capitulate before 
us. The world will then understand that Eastern Asia is ours, 
and w01 not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan entrusted 
to us by Emperor Medji, and its success is of substantial signifi- 
cance for our national existence. 
The Nine Powers Agreement is exclusively the d e c t i w  of the 
spirit of trade 14vaIry. England and America mated, means 
of their great wealth, to smash our influence in Chins. ?'he pro- 
posal for the limitation of armaments is merely a means of curtail- 
Ing our military power and depriving us of the 
~onquering the huge territory of China. On the o~:"Ez 2 
wealth of China wilI be in their hands, exdusively. This agree- 
ment is a plan by means of which England and America wisb to 
smash our plans. The Minseito Governmege made a great affair 
of this Nine Powers Agreement, and empbasised our trade rather 
than our rights in China. Tbis policy is incorrect: it is a policy 
OF national suicide. England can allow herself the Iuxury of 
talking about trade only because she has India and Australia, 
which supply her with foodstuffs and other goods. Tbe same 
refers to America, for South America and Canada satisfy her 
requirements. Their energies can be wholly devoted to the develop- 
ment of trade in China for the purpose of enriching thtmselves. 
But the reserves of fodstuffs and raw materials in Japan are 
korning less and kss as her population, increases. I If we put all 
our hopes u p  the development of trade, we may be smashed bj 
England and Amerih, with their invincible capitalist might. Ir 
the end we get nothing at all. A more dangerous factor is the hci 
that the Chinese people may wake up one fine day. Even now, 
in these days of internal confusion, they can peacefully toit and 
try to mimic us and displace'our goods, thus hindering the dqvehp 
went of our trade. Wben we remember that the Chinese are our 
oniy purchasers, we must fear the day when China unites and her 
industry begins to flourish. Americans and Europeans will com- 
pete with us, and our trade with China will be smashed,, The 
proposaI of Minseito to leave the Nine Powers Agreement in force 
and pursue a trading policy towards Manchuria is nothing but a 
policy of suicide. 
Having studied the existing,conditions and possibilities inside 
our country, we have to confess that our best policy amounts te 
taking positive measures for the purpose of safeguadiog our 
rights and privilcgm in Manchuria and Mongolia. They will 
make it possible for us to develop our trade. This will not onIy 
hdd back the industrial development of China itself, but will dis- 
allow the penetration of European Powers into China. This i s  
the only sane policy, the best policy. 
In order to win ma1 rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, we 
must use this district as a base, and penetrate into the rest of 
China under the pretext of dweIoping our trade, Armed with 
already safeguarded rights, we &all seize the resources of thc 
entire Land. With a11 the resources of China at our disposal, we 
shall pass forward to the conquest of India, the Archipelago, Asia 
Minor, Central Asia and even Europe. But the first step mu& 
be the seimrc of control over Manchuria and Moa~olia, if 
the Yamatr, race wishes to surpass itself in cuntinental Asta. The 
final victory will fall to that country which has sufficient f d  
stores. Indusrrial praspority is possible only in countries which 
are secure from thc point of view of foodstuft's and raw materials; 
the full development of national power is possible only in a State 
which exte~~ds over an enormous territory. If we pursue a positive 
policy, extending our rights in Manchuria and in China, all these 
conditions so essential to a mighty nadm will cease to k pro- 
blems. Moreover, our surplus population will be provided for, 
amounting as it does to 70o,0o0 annually. If we wish to begin a 
new policy and guarantee the permanent welfare of our Empire, 
we must pursue a positive policy towards Manchuria and 
Mongolia. 
MANCHURIA A??D MONGOLIA ARtf NOT CHINESE TERRITORY. 
Prom the historical point of view Manchuria and Mongolia are 
not Chinese territory or Chinese possessions. Dr. Yano has made 
a fundamental study of Chinese history and has come to tbe eon- 
clusion that Manchuria and Mongolia were never Chinese territory. 
This fact has been made pubtic to the world by the authritative 
representative of the Imperial University. The investigations of 
Dr. Yano are so meticulous that there can be found no professor 
in China who disputes them. Nevertheless it is a most unfortunate 
circumstance that in declaring war upon Russia our Government 
openly recopisad the sovereignty of China over all other countries 
and repeated the same thing at the Washington Conference, when 
we signed the Nine Powers Agreement, As a result of these two 
mistakes of ours, the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and 
Mongolia is now established in diplomatic relatinns, and our 
interests consequently sufier. Although China talks about the 
Five Races Republic, nevertheless Tibet, Sintsiang, Mongolia and 
Manchuria were always in the pad special districts, and the 
princes bad their own customs rights. In actual fact, therefore, 
the princes held the sovereign rights, We must explain the true 
state of affairs to the world at the first opportunity. W e  should 
also have penetrated into Inner and Outer Mongolia in order to 
reform the country. While the princes carry on their former 
adrninistrativc functions there, mereign rights are in their hands. 
If we wish to penetrate into these territories, wc must look upon 
them as the rulers and negotiate with them concerning rights and 
privileges. We shall have a fine opportunity and our national 
influence wili rapidly grow. 
W R  POSITIVE POLICY W MMCHURIA. 
As for rights in Manchuria, we must take decisive steps on the 
basis of our twentysne demands and attain the foliowing in order 
to safeguard the rights we have won :- 
(I) W h e n  the agreement concerning trade leases expiies in 1931, 
we must obtain the opportunity of extending the period as 
we wish. Further, our right to Iease land for commercial, 
industrial and agricultural purposes must lx mgnised. 
(2 )  Japanese citizens must have the right to travel through, and 
live in, the Eastern part 01 blongolia and engage in trade 
and industrial occupations there. China must free tbem 
from subjection to the Chinese law. They must not Ix liable 
to illegal taxation and illegal interrogation. 
(3) We must have the right to exploit nineteen coal and iron 
works in Fengtien and Kirin, and also the right to exploit 
the rich forests. 
(4) W e  must have the first rights in connection with the wn- 
stmction of railways and the placing of Ioaas for this 
purpose in S u t h  Manchuria and East Mongolia. 
(5)  The number of Japanese political, financial and military 
advisers must be increased, W e  must have the first right 
to give our own advisers. 
(6) W e  must have the right to organise police stations for the 
defence of Koreans in China. 
(7) The term of direction and development of the Kirin-Chan- 
chung railway must be extended to 99 ymrs. 
(8) We must have the exclusive right to sell spechl goods, and 
the first right to support marine traffc from Europe and 
America. 
(9) W e  must be given the excIusive right to work up the 
mineral sources in Hei Lung-kiang. 
(10) W c  must k given the right to build the K i r i n - H o * ~  and 
Tsen-Tsin-Dalai railways. 
JS 
(11) Should money k required to buy up the Chinese-Eastern 
Railway, the Japanese Government h u l d  be given tbe Erst 
right to offer a loan to China. 
(12 )  We must be given specid rights in the Andun and Inkow 
ports and the right of transit transportation a c m ~  these 
harhurs. 
(13) W e  must bc -partners of the Central Bank of the three 
Eastern provinces. 
frq) W e  must have the right of exploitation and of pasturage. 
THIi WSlTIVE WLICY TQWARDS INNER AND OUTER MONGOLU. 
Since Manchuria and Mongolia ate still in the hands of the 
native princes, we must in future recogtlise them as the rulers of 
these lands and offer tbern support. Guided by this consideration, 
the daughter af the Kwantun Governor-General, Fukushia, 
risked her life by living among the barbarian Mongolianrpula- 
tion in Tuschitu, where she fulfilled the r81e of adviser to e local 
prince and thus served the Imperial Government. Since the niece 
of the Manchurian prince, Su, bemme the wife of the governing 
prince, the relations between the Government and the Mongolian 
princes have become considerably closer. All the princes of l ~ e r  
and Outer Mongolia hold us in great respect, especially since we 
encourage them with special gifts and protection. There are at 
present nineteen retired Japanese officers in Tuschitu Wt have 
already obtained h e  monopoly of the purchase of wool, and the 
exploitation of mining resources there. We shall send secretly 
a still larger number of retired officers. They must be dressed as 
Chinamen, in order not to draw the attention of the Mukden 
Government. Scattered in various places, they may engage in 
agriculturr, cattle-breeding and the trading of wool. We can 
behave towards other princes just as we behaved to the prince in 
Tuschitu. We must have our retired officers everywhere, in 
order to gain the control of the princes. When there will be 
enough of our people in Inner and Outer Mongolia, we $ball buy 
up the Imd, paying for it one-tenth of its true value, and kgin 
to grow rice there in order to inerase our stock of foodstuffs. 
Where the land is not suitable for the production of rice, we can 
engage in cattle-breeding and breed horses, which would be very 
important in the military sense. In other places we can engage 
in the canning industry and export our goods to Europe and 
America, We shall alsu gain much by developing the fur arrd 
teather industry. Finally, Inner and Outcr Mongolia will fall 
entirely into our hands. Since the question of sovereign rights 
is not sufficiently dear here, and the Chinese and Soviet Govern- 
ments are engaged on other aEairs, we can peacefully extend our 
influence. When we have a large section of the land in our hands, 
there will be no longer any question as to whether Mrmgolh 
belongs to the Japanese or to the Mongolians. Backed up by our 
military forces, we can rdise our positive policy. In order U 
acbi ie  this plan, one million yen must be assigned from &e 
'f secret fund of the War Ministry" and 400 r e t i d  office= muat 
be sent to inner and Outer Mongolia. These officers dressed ar 
Chinese citizens and acting as teachers, must live among tbe 
population and gain the confidence of the Mongolian primes, 
obtain from them the right to engage in cattle-breeding aud 
mining, and thus lay the foundations of our national interests for 
the coming hundred years. 
IN SUPPORT AND DEFENCE OF KOREAN MMIGRA'TlON. 
Sincx we annexed Korea, we have had very littIe trouble t b m .  
However, the dcclaratiun of President Wilson concerning the self- 
determination of races, made after the European war, played the 
d i e  of a sacred revelation to the oppressed nations. The Koreans 
were no exception and the spirit of dissatisfaction sprertd through- 
out the land. As a resuk of the freedom which they enjoy in 
Manchuria, thanks to the imperfect police system, and also owing 
to the wealth of the land, no less than one million Koreans are to 
be found in the three Eastern provinces. This development is 
extremely advantageous for us, and has considerably raised our . 
influence from the economic and military point of view. On the 
other hand, this gives us fresh hopes in the sphere of administra- 
tion far the Koreans, They will be our vanguard in the colonists- 
tion of untouched lands and wiI1 be the link which binds us with 
the Chinem people. On the one hand, we wouId be able to makt 
use of the aaturalised Koreans for the purpose of purchasing lands 
for growing rice, oa the other hand, we could give them financial 
assistance through our co-operative societies, of the South Man- 
churia railways and so on, and thus we should be able to use them 
first of all for our economic penetration. Tbis would mitigate our 
position in connection with foodstuffs and at the same time open 
up new possibiIities of colanisation. Koreans who become 
Chinese subjects are only Chinese formdy and they will probably 
return to us. They cannot be cumpared with the naturalid 
Japanese in California and South America. They have merely 
become Chinese temporarily. When their number reaches two- 
and-a-half million ,and more, it will be possible to incite them, In 
case of nwessity, to military action, and we shall support them, 
assuring them that we are suppressing the Korcsn movement. 
Since not all the Koreans have become Cbinese subjects, in oihet 
muntries it will not be known who actualfy brought about tbt 
disorderdhinese or Japanese Koreans. We shall always bt 
able to mislead world pubkc opinion. 
Since it is possible for us to use the Koreans for this purpose, 
we must take measures to ensure that the Chinese do not use them 
against us. But Manchuria is as much under our jurisdiction as 
it is under Chinese. If the Chinese try to make use of the Ko~eaas 
for war against us, we shall have an excuse for making war upon 
China. In that case Soviet Russia would be the most dangerous 
factor. If the Chinese use the "Reds" to influence the Koreans, 
then the outlook of our peopIe wilI change and a great danger will 
threaten us. The present Cabinet, in view of this, is taking all 
precautionary measures against this possibility. If we want 'to 
urn the Koreans for the purposc of developjng our new mntinentnl 
Empire, we must work out our measures for their defenw as care- 
fully as possible. We must increase our police fon-e in North 
Manchurra on the basis of the Mitsuin Agreement, in order to be 
able to use this force in support of the K o r a ~ s  and to help them 
to move forward rapidly. Totku Kaischa (the Society for the 
Development of the East) and the South klancl~uria Railway Com- 
pany must also give th financial nssistance. The Koreans must 
be placed in specially a 7 vantageous conditions in order that they 
may develop the riches of Manchuria and Mongolia and monopr,- 
lise dl rights of trade. The influx of Romans into these terri- 
,torits is of such enormous economic and military importance, that 
.the Imperial Government cannot fail to support it. I t  opens up 
new prospects for our Empire, Since the Wasl~ington Confere~rce 
swept away all the advantages of the agreement cor~cluded between 
Lansing and Ischi, our psition can be restoretl only by thc 
presence in Manchu* of several millions of Koreans. As regards 
international relations there can be no difficulties in this respect. 
THE RAILWAYS AND ' T t l E  IlEVEtOPLlENT OF OUR NEW CONT'WBNT. 
Transport is the basis of national defence, the guarantee uf 
success and the starting point of economic development. The 
Chinese railways extend over 7,aoo7,3w miles, 3,000 of which 
are in Manchuria nnd Mongolia. Taking into consideration the 
size of Manchuria and Mongolia and the abundance uuf their 
natural resources, we may say that more railroads are required 
there, extending over no less than 5 , m  to 6,om miles. It is a 
great pity that aur railways are concentrated mainly in Southern 
Manchuria and do not extend to the sources of wealth which arc 
to be found in the northern part of the land. There are many 
Chinese in  South Manchuria who are favoumbly indineti towards 
our military and economic plans. If we wish to rfcvelop our 
natural w d t h  and strengthen our national defence, we must build 
railways in North Manchuria. We can tben send more Japanese 
to North Manchuria. From there we shail be able to strengthen 
considerably our political and ecrrnomic development in South 
Manchuria and strengthen our national defence in thc interests of 
peace and order in the Far East. The South Manchurian RaR- 
way w s  built mainly for economic purprBses. There are no circa- 
hr railroads, which are so necessary for the ,mobilisat!m and 
'trmsprt of troops. From now onwar<ls we must pusue our 
military aims and surround the heart of Manshuri'a. and Mangulia 
with circular railways, in order, oa the one hand, to s n d  tbe 
military, political and economic development of China a d ,  on thic 
other band, to hold back the penetration of Russian iinfueace. 
This is the key to our continental policy. - - 
There are two main railways in Manchuria and Mongolia : the 
Cbinese-Eastern and the South Manchurian. As for the rail- 
mad5 constructed by the Chinese, they wiU doubtless be of huge 
importance now because of the financial support of the Kirh Pro- 
vincial Government. Based upon the combined resources of the 
Fengtiea Govei-nment and the Heilunkiang province, the Chinese 
railways will considerably overtake our South Manchurian Rail- 
way in development and begin violent competition. Fortunately for 
us  the financial situation in the Fengtien Government is extremely 
disturbed, and without uur help the Chinese powers cannot put 
matters to rights. Wc must make use of this. W e  must take 
positive steps and gain our ends in the matter of milway construc- 
tion. If we are able to manipulate, the banknotes of the Fengtien 
Government will k a m e  entirety worthless ancl the province will 
then bc unable, of course, to think of developing the Manchuria 
and Mongolia. But we must remember the Chinese-Eastern Rail- 
way. It forms the letter "T" with the South Manchurian Rail- 
way. This system does not answer our military purposes, If we 
look upon the S u t h  Manchurian Railway as the main branch, 
then the Chinese should build their railroads in the direction of 
North to South, which would answer their requirements. Thus 
our interests ought not therefore to come into conflict with the 
Chinese. Now that Russia has lost all her influence and is not in 
a position to penetrate into f i n c h r i a  and Mongolia, the Chinese 
must support us in our railmad construction. To our surprise, 
however, the Fcngtien Government recently mnstructed two rail- 
ways from Taguschin to TunIiao and from Kirin to Hainin for 
exclusively military purposes. Tbese two railways are extremely 
unfavourablc for our military plans in Manchuria and hlongolia 
and to the interests of the Manchurian Railway. We mast,ener 
getidly protested, therefore, against this construction work. 
If in the end these railways were constructed, this is becausc 
our representative, cquaBy with the representatives of the South 
3lanchurian Railway, under-estimated the possibilities of the 
Fmgtien Government. -%en we intervened, it was already too 
late and the railway was finished. The Americans tried to invest 
capital in Port Hulutao and to develop it with the help of I3riti.h 
capitalists. Thc Fengtien Government made use of this and 
invested American and British capital in these raiIways in order 
to deliver a blow at us. All we can do now is to await a suit&bIe 
moment for opening up negatiations with China concerning them 
two railways. 
Of late r & ~ ~ ~ r s  have been s p m d  to the dect that the Fen* 
Government intends running a road from Tagusehan to HarvIn 
via Tunliao and Fu-Yu. This will be a direct l i e  between Peking 
and Narb'm, which will not touch either the South Manchurian or 
the Chinese-Eastern Railways. More a s t d i n  still is the facr 
that they intend running another line from Muk d: en to Harbin via 
Hailun, Kirin, Uchan. If this plan is carried out, these two lines 
will surround the South Manchurian Railway and limit its sphere 
of activity to the minimum. This will smash our pojitical and 
economic development of Manchuria and Mongolia, the aim of 
the Nine Powers Agreement will be reached, and our powers 
limited. The completion of these two railways will make the South 
Manchurian Railway entirely useless. The South Maodhurian 
Railway Cwnpany will find itself face to face with a real crisis. 
However, in the existing fimncbl conditions China cannot can- 
struct these two lines farther north than the South Manchurian 
line. This should put us somewhat at ease. But if these two lines 
are built and the Cbinese Government fixes cheap rates in order 
to compete with the South Manchurian line, tben not only we, but 
the CRineseEastern Railway as well will sustain a loss. Japan 
and Russia, of course, will trot permit China to put through these 
measures of obstruction, the more so since the ChineeEastern 
Railway is largely dependent upon freight despatched frwn 
Tsitsikar and Harbin. 
The South Manchurian Railway does not answer out purposes. 
Taking into consideration our present requirements and our activi- 
ties in the future, we must have control over the railways bath in 
North and South Manchuria The number of Chinese grm so 
rapidly in South Manchuria that our politiml and economic 
interests sustain losses. We are campelled in tbe circurnmces 
to take aggressive measures in North Manchuria in order to safe- 
p a r d  our prosperity in the future. But if the Chinese-Eastern 
Railway, belonging to Soviet Russia, devclops in this district, 
then our new continental policy will w i v e  a blow which will 
inevitably bring about conflict with Soviet Russia in the near 
future. In this case we shall again be obliged to play the r8lc 
we phyed in the RussJapanese war, The Chinese-Eastern Rail- 
way will become ours just as the South Manchurian Railway 
became ours, and we shall seize Ririn as we seized Dairea. It 
seems that the inevitabidity of crossing swords with Russia on the 
Adds of Mongolia in order to gain passession of the wealth of 
North Manchuria is part of our programme of national develop- 
ment. Until these Ridden rocks are blown up, our vessel cannot 
move rapidly ahead. W e  must demand from China the right to 
build important military railways. Wfien these railways are 
finished, wc can fill North Man~huria to overflowing with 
our forces. Soviet Russia will have to interfere and ibis wilI be 
our pretext for open conflict. 
W e  must insist on ihe construction of the fallowing railways :- 
( r )  Tunlia+Sheches Railway. This will extend over 447 miles 
and h e  cost of constructian will be. SO million yen* Wbe31 it is 
completed it will be enormously useful in our struggle to devebp 
Inner Mongolia. This, incidentally, is the most important trail- 
way line for us. Careful investigations by the W m  M&trp 
have shown that there are enormous stretches of land in Inner 
Mongolia suitable for the cultivation of rice. Witb this ldistriCt 
properly developed, no fewer than 20 million of our Japanese pap- 
Iation can live there. -4s many as two million head of cattle - 
bc bred there, which we a n  use both for food and for expm to 
Europe and America. Finally, there is the woof. The Mongolian 
sheep give three times as much wool as the Japanese. The South 
Manchurian Railway Company has made several experiments b 
prove this fact. The Mongolian wool is far better than Australian. 
Thanks to their cheap highquality wool which they have in 
enormous quantities, Mongalia is  a potential source of enormous 
wealth. If wc support this industry by deveIoping the railways, 
the output will increase ten times at  least. W e  are hiding this 
fact from the rest of the world that England and America may 
not begin to compete with us. W e  must therefore as a first step 
get control of the tmnsport and then begin to develop the woollen 
industry. If other countries get to hear of this in advance we 
may find it is  too late. With the railways st our disposal, we em 
develop the wo~llen industry not only for our awn requirements, 
but for export to Europe and America. We shall Ire able to 
achieve our plans for the possession of Mongolia. This railway 
is a vital question for our policy in Mongolia. Without it Japan 
csmnat play any r81e in Mongolian development. 
(a) The Solun-Taonan Railway. This line will extend over 136 
miles and will cost 10 million yen. If we look into the future of 
Japan we have to admit the inevitability of war with Russia on 
the fields of North Manchuria. From the military point of view 
this railway will nor only allow us to threaten Russia from the 
rear, but will deprive Russia of the possibility of bringing up 
reinforcements into North Mongolia. From the economic point 
of view this road makes it possible for us to exploit the rich 
rwurces of the Tao-Erho valley and strengthen tbe pi t ion  of 
the South Manchurian Pne. The princes of the surrounding 
districts, who are friendly disposed towards us, will be able to 
use this line to increase aur infludce and open up their territories 
to us. Our chances of co-oprating with the Mongolian princes, 
obtaining land, mines and pasture-lands, and opening up h d e  
with the native population, which is essential to our fnrther 
penetration into the land, dl depend upon this railroad. m a ,  
together with the Tunliaa-Sheches Raitway, will mean two r d -  
roads leading into Mongolia. When industry is fully developed 
we shalI be abIe to spread our influence throughout Outer 
Mongolia. This lime is dangerous, however, in that it can facilii- 
tate the migration of tbe Chinese into this new distrid and &us 
harm our policy. Remember the South Manehuh Railway. 
Does it not serve the interests of China? An important pint is 
that the land and the mineral depcsits lying in the neighbourhd 
of the railway belong to Mongolian princes. If we obtain posses- 
sion of these lands and mines there will be no need to fear Chinese 
immigration. We can even compel the princes to pass Iaws 
prohibiting Chinese immigration. If life becomes d i h l t  for the 
Chinese, they will of course leave the place. There are other 
methods as well, by means of which it would be possible to 
prevent the Chinese from inhabiting these places. If we are 
suficiently energetic, no sign of the Chinese will bc .left on 
Mongolian territory. 
(3) The Chanchun-Tnonan section. As this railroad goes from 
Chanchun ta Fuyu and Dafai, the line between Chanchun and 
'Faonan will extend over 131 miles and cost approximately r r  
miltion yen. This line is of enormous economic irnportrmce, for 
the wealth of Manchuria and Mongolia is concentrated in North 
Manchuria. We shall obtain access to North Manchuria ornd help 
the South Manchurian Railway, thus aiming a blow at East China. 
The railroad pass- through the valley of the River Sungari, where 
the soil is extremely fertile and there is an abundance of agricul- 
tural products. h'ear to DaIai ore the YueIian watetfalls which 
can be used fur electrical energy. It is clear that this section of 
the milway will become a flourishing centre of industry and agri- 
culture. Having built this line we can convert Dalai into a base 
for our advance upon Siberia along three roads: via Taonan. 
Anchai~ and Tsitsikar. The wealth of North Manchuria will fall 
into our hands, This line will help us  to advance to Heilunkiang 
as well. Together with thc road between Chanchua and Taonan, 
this will farm n circular line which will be of strategical import- 
:in= in our aim to penetrate into Mongolia. The population here 
is very sparse, but the land is rich. For a period of fifty years 
there will be no need to use fertitiscrs. Having possession of 
this road we can control ali the riches of North Manchuria and 
+ Mongolia. Here another 30 million people at least ean live. 
When tbe Dunchuask m d  is cwmpleted and joined up with thc 
line running from Hoiren to Korea, all products can be transported 
direct to Osaka and Tokio. I n  case of war, we should be able 
to sent1 our troops into ~ortti'  Manchuria and Mongolia through 
the Sea of Japan direct, which would give the Chinese mops nu 
chance of penctraiing into North Manchuria. Neither American 
nor Russian boats can pass through the Korean Straits. As soon 
as the roads between Kirin and Hoinen and Chonchun and Dalai 
are compIeted, we shall be independent in the sphere of provisions 
and raw materials. I n  case of war no country can interfere with 
us. Therefore, when negotiations begin about Manchuria and 
Mongolia, China will have to submit and agree to our demands, 
1f we want to put an end to the political existence of Manchuria 
and bfongdii, in accordance with the third phase of the plan of 
Emperor Medji, we must complete these two railways. Chanchun- 
Dalai Railway will coasiderably t4se the value of the South 
Manchurian Railway md will itself be a paying conam. This is 
a most important beginning in our effort to penetrate into this 
t errirory, 
(4) Kirin-Hoiren line. Although the Kirin-Dunchwk line is 
already complete, the Dunchuask-Hoiren line bas yet to be con- 
structed. The narrow zft. Bin. gauge which we h m  between 
Hoiren and Laod-Goigoi is of nu use for the economic development 
of tire new continent. Eight million yet must be spent to bmden 
the gauge in this part of the line and ro million yen on the con- 
struction of the Laod-Goigoi Hunhua line. TI& will cost 
approximately ao million yen. When this is  done we shall achieve 
success in our continental policy. Up to now, persons tmvetlig 
to Europe have been ~mmpelled to travel either through Ddren 
or Vladivostock. Mow they can travel direct from Tsen-Tsin over 
the Siberian Railway. When this enormous transprt system is 
in our hands, we shall have no need to hide our intentions in 
.Manchuria and Mongolia, which form the third phase of the Medji 
pians. The Yamato race will then go forward to mnquer the 
world. According to the legacy of Medji, our first step was tn 
conquer Formosa and the second to annex Korea. Now the third 
step must be taken which consists in the conquest of Manchuria, 
Mongolia and China. When this has been done, a11 the rest of 
Asia, including the islands of the South Seas will lie at our feet. 
The fact that these tasks have not yet been fulAl1ed is  a crime on 
the part of your servants. 
The pcnple living in Kirin, Fengtien and a part of Heilunkiang 
are called in histofy thc Suchans. The Suchans are scattered 
along the sea coast and the valleys af the Amur and Tiumen rivers, 
During various historical epuchs they were referred to as 
Kulnyams, Suchons, Guebeys, Pals, Vots, Fuyus, Kendans, 
Bokhnys, Nushens. They are n mixed race. The fordathers of 
the Manchurian dynasty were b r n  hem A t  first they possessed 
Kirin and thcn established their power in China for 300 years. # 
I f  wc wish to pursue our continental policy, we must =Ice &s 
historicnl fact into consideration and first of all settle in this 
district. Hence tlte necessity for building the Kirin-Hoiren 
Railway. 
The decision ns to whether this road should finish in Tsm-Tsin 
or Lochin, or even Sunitsi, will depcnd upon circumstances. From 
the point of vim of national defence, Lachin is  the ideal harbour 
and the ideal terminus. It is possible that this will be the best 
harbour in theworld. On the one hand it will ruin Vlrdivostock 
nnd on the other hand it will be the centre of the r ides  of 
Manchuria and Mongolia, Daim is not yet our territory, and 
while Alanchurin i s  still nat part of our Empire, it wiJI be difficult 
to dwelop this town. As a result we should be in a difficult 
position in case of war. The enemy could blockade the Tsusirna 
and Senshina Straits and we should be cut off from Mauchuria 
and MungoEa. Having lost our resources, we should be conquered, 
the more so since England and America bave been working jointly 
to cut down our power in these ctistricts. One day we s b d  have 
to fight against America to defend ourselves and to be a warning 
to China as wdl. The American Asiatic Fleet whose base is jn 
the Philippine Islands, wodd be near to Tsusima and S e n l k a .  
I f  they were to send submarines to these places we shouId be 
completely cut off from our Manchurian and Mongolian sources 
of provisions and tslw materials, But if the Kirin-Hoiren Railway 
wcrc completed, we should have a big circular line around the 
whole of Manchuria and Korea and a small line in North 
Manchuria. W e  would bave complete freedom of movement in 
all directions and could send our soldiers and the necessary s u p  
plies in all directions. If we were able to supply all necessary 
materials to our pow in Tsuruga and Nigata, with the help of 
this railway line, the submarines of the enemy would not be able 
to enter the Japanese and Korean Straits. In this case nobody 
could interfere with us and the Japanese Sea would be the centre 
d our national defence. 
Having safeguarded the transport of provisions and raw 
materials, we would have nothing to fear from the American 
fleet or the Chinese or Russian armies. W e  could put dawn the 
Korean movement. I repeat, if we want to pursue our new con- 
tinental policy, we must build this line. Manchuria and Mongolia 
are Eastern countries svhich are nbsolutefy undeveloped. S-er 
or later we shall have to fight against Soviet Russia. The fight 
will takc place in Kirin. 
In order to take the third step of the Medji plan as regards 
China, we must act as follows :- 
I .  W e  must mobiiiso tho army divisions in Fukuoka and 
Hiroshima and despatch them into South Manchuria through 
Korea. Thus we shall prevent the movement of Chinese soldiers 
to the North. 
a. We shall send the army divisions at present in Nagoia and 
Huansi by sea to Tsin-Tsin, and from there to North Manchuria 
by the Girin-Hoiren Iine. 
3. The Kwantun army will be despatched through Nigata and 
Chuchii or Login, and from there by the Kirin-Hoim road to 
North Manchuria 
4. The army divisions at  present in Hokaido and SendJ must 
be despatched by sea from Aornori and Hokodato to Vladivostock, 
and from there by the Siberian railway to Harbin. They will 
stop at Fintuan, seize Mongolia and prevent the Russians from 
moving south. 
5. A11 these divisions will form two large armies. In the 
south they will m u p y  Shanghaihuang md defend it from the 
northward march of the Chinese troo~s. In ?he north they will 
defend Tsitsikar from the movement i f  Russian troops inio tbe 
south. Thus all the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia will 
fall into our hands. Even if the war continues for ten years, 
we shall have no fear of being left without supplies and armaments. 
Let us see how far the Gin-Hoiren road is from our ports. 
Taking Tsin-Tsin as the starting point, from there to Vladivostock 
w o l d  be 130 miles, to Tsuruga 475 miles, to M d j i  5m miles, 
Magaski 650 miles, Fusan 5m miles. 
Take Port Tsuruga as the starting p&t. In tbis case we muat 
take Osaka into consideration as the industrial centre. 
I.  Fmm Chanchun to Osaka is 406 miles by laad via Login 
and 475 miles by sea. The journey takes gx h o w  
a. If the journey is made through D h  and Kobe, then 
Chanchun is 535 miles from Osaka by land and 8p1 miles by sea. 
The journey takes gz hours. 
If Tsuruga is the point of departure instead of Dairen, an 
ecanomy of 41 hours is mada If we reckon 30 miles an hour by 
land and 12 miles an hour by sea, we can curtail the length of 
the journey by one half, using the best ships and fast trains. 
Manchuria and Mongolia are the Belgiurns of the Far East. 
During the Great War, Belgium was converted into a httlaeld. 
In our wars with Russia and the United States we must make 
Manchuria and Mungolia bear all the horrors of war. As it is 
obvious that wc shall have to violate the neutrality of these terri- 
tories, it is essential that we build the Kirin-Hoiren and Chaadun- 
Dalai railways, as they are necessary for our military prepadous. 
In case of war we can then easily increase our militzuy forces, 
and in peace time we can transport thousands of people into this 
district and cultivate rice there. This railway line, therefore, g i ~ w  
us the opportunity of economic development m d  of conquests with 
the help of armed forces. 
The construction of the Kirin-Hoirehilway must be completed 
during the dry weather. The road has to pass through granite 
mountains. In order to make the tunnels the most u-te 
machines must be used. There is plenty of sand, bricks, clay and 
so on in this district, so we shall feel no shortage in this respect 
in building the road. Only rails, trucks and locomotives .will have 
to be brought up. Far this reason it will be possible to lower 
the cost of construction by at least 30 per cent. and finish the 
work in half the usual time required. 
Careful investigations Rave been made by our General Staff 
Headquarters in the South Manchurian Railway Company, whicb 
show that in those districts lying along the railway, there are n w  
million tans of timber. If we fell one million tons annually for 
impart into our country, we can do tbis for a period of o w  years. 
We shall then not require Arnerimn- timber, which costs us 80 
to 109 million yen annually. W e  cannot speak of this openly, 
for if China and Russia hear that we receive so much timber from 
Manchuria, they will want to compete with us and will tbernselves 
take over the construction of this line. Moreover, the United 
States might purchase the right to exploit this timber from the 
Fengtien Government. America could then kill our paper industry. 
Kirin was called the "ocean of trees" even during the reign of 
Emperor Tsiaa-Lunia. Since then ncw trees have been planted. 
I t  would be difficult to imagine the wealth of these forests. In 
order tn transport thii timber from Kirin to Osaka through 
Chanehun and Dairen, a distance of 385 miles has to be covered. 
W e  have to pay 34 cents for eacb cubic foot of timber. In view 
of the expensive cost of transport, we cannot compete with 
America. However, if the Kirin-Hoiren railway is constructed, 
this distance can be curtailer1 by 700 miles. We could then 
despatch our timber by sea to Osaka at the cost of only 13 cents 
per cubic foot. W e  should then, of course, dispIace America 
entirely. If we reckon that one ton of timkr gives a profit of 
5 yen, then two milliard tons of timber would make it possible for 
us, thanks to the railway, to easily make a profit of one milliard 
yen. We should prohibit the import of American timber to Japan. 
Moreover, thanks to the reduction in the pricw of timber, we shoulrl 
be able to make another ao million yen a year through our fumi- 
ture, paper, industries, etc. 
There an: the coal-mines of Sinchin as well, with 600 million 
tons of coal. In quality it is higher than the Fmhun coal, it is 
easily obtained and from it kerosene can be produced, which we 
could use ourselvcs or sell to China. The Kirin-Hoiren Railway 
would bring us several other advantages without the slightest 
difficulty. The mnl would be an addition to that of the Fusbun 
mines. With both these coalf~dds in our bands, we should have 
the key to the industries of China, We could make 5 yen a ton 
on the transport of Sinchi coal to Japan. This profit would riw 
to 16 yen, if we use dI t h chemical by-products from this mat. 
If we reckon an average of 15 yen profit on one ton, we should 
obtain on an average 200 milliard yen profit. All this wa should 
obitlin exclusively as a result of rhe Kirin-Hoiren Railway. 
Further, there are the goldfields alang the River Mutan, As a w n  
as the Kirin-Hoiren Railway begins to work, the Swth Manchurian 
Railway Company wi1I be able to make use of the rights it has 
gained in connection with the goidfields in Tsepigoy and tbe Kirin 
industrial nnd timber resources. A huge quantity of.agrieultura1 
~~~~~~ats, wheat and so on- be had near to Dunhua, 
Them are also to be found ao wine distilling works, 30 factories 
working up vegetable oils and so on. All this can be ours if we 
build the railway. Along the railroad trade can be carried on 
with an annual turnover of 4 minion yen. The transport of agri- 
cultural protlucts alone will not only cover all the exploitation 
r;osts, but will give a net profit of 200,- yen a year. 
into consideration the pmfits to be &ad by tho 
timber, coal and by-products, we should obtain th -3 #,@ 
million yen annually. Besides this, our position an the Mach* 
W w a p  would be consolidated ; we should acquire rights k 
aection with timber, mi- and sa on and a huge number d 
Japanese would be migrated into Nortb Manchuria, As a 6rst 
step it is important to curtail the distance between J a w  and the 
swrces of wealth in North Manchuria. I t  will take d j  three 
hours to reu& Hailin from Tsin-Tsin. Three bours would be 
required to travel from H a i m  to Sanfin and three hours more 
tb cover the distance between the river Timinula and Luntsinbm. 
In 60 hours we could reach the rich resources of North Manchu&. 
TI& road alone will make it possible for us to seize the emmmus 
riches d Nartb Manchuria. 
q. Huncbun-Hailin railroad. The road will cover 173 mila, 
and cost a4 million yen to construct. Along this line there we 
dense forest lands. This road is essential i f  we are to s h n g t b m  
the Kirin-Hoiren road and exploit the t imkr  and mines of North 
Manchuria. It is essential if we are to convert Hoiten into a 
flourishing centre at the expense of Vladivostock. To the south 
of Hoiren and to the north of Dunhua there is the Chintso Lake, 
w G h  can be used for electrical energy. With this supply of 
energy at our disposal, we ean gain control of the agricdturaf 
and industrial undertakings of Manchuria and Momia. The 
investigations of the South Manchurian Railway Company show 
that the lake can give at least 8a0,om horse-pww. With thh 
mass of e l d e a l  energy we can easily conquer the industries of 
Manchuria and Mongolia Rich resourns will be available nwar 
to this enormous power centre, which will increase with $heno- 
mend rapidity. W e  must quickly build this railway to facilitate 
the bansport. The Sin-kai lake is in the pos%ssion of China and 
Russia, and can also be used for purposes of elmtrial energy. 
In order that thew two muntries leave our p h s  untouched, we 
must pass a resolution at the international Electr+Cooferenr# 
which will take place in Toki~  tbis y k  to the effect tbat in nu 
district should there be more than one power s t a h .  The paper 
fhctory--Odju--has also obtained considerable rights in connec- 
tion with timber near Nigata and Hailin. This factory requires 
that a power station be ~wstructed immediately on Lake Chiap, 
and the Hunchun-HaiIin Railway lx constructed as quickly as 
I 
possible, for then it would be possible with great rapidity to 
transport raw materials growing wild in Mongolia. 
If tbe Fen-Hi&-Uchan Railway Company and the Kirin authod- 
ties intend building the Uchan and Kirin-Mukdun Railway, with 
Hulutao and Tientsia as ports, this is because tbey wish w gain 
possession of the riches of Nortb Manchuria, Havh b d t  the 
Huncbun-HaUin Railway we should not only it& Kirk- 
Hoirea, but would smash the Chinese plans and direct the flow of 
Manchurian riches ta Part Tsin-Tsin. The cost of transport 
would be one-third of the cast on the Chinese Railway and one- 
half of the Siberian. They would be incapable of competing 
against us, add the victory would be ours. 
The total trade turnover in Manchuria is 7 to 8 milliard yen 
annuany, and all: this trade would be in our hands. Our trade in 
wool, cotton, soya beans, iron, amounts to one-twentieth of the 
world trade. Our trade is continudly increasing. However, the 
wealthiest street in Dairen is in the hands of the Chinese. And 
this is not all. me production of vegetable oil is the main b-ch 
of industry in Manchuria. Our share of this industry is only 6 
per cent. Out of 38 factories in the vegetable oil industry in 
Inkow, there is not one Japanese. Out of 20 factories in Andun 
only one i s  Japanese, and out of 82 or 83 in Dairen only seven are 
Japanese. This is a great pity. la order to gain our lost positions, 
we must first of nU develop the transport. Having gained controI 
of tbe monopoly of finished products and raw materials, we l o u l d  
occupy a dominating position in this industry. Moreover, we 
must help the Japanese, engaged in this industry, by granting 
them large credits and thus displace the Chinese. In Osaka there 
are many Chmcsc trading our manufactud goods in M-lia 
and Manchuria. They put up a strong competition against.tbn 
Japanese living in -China. I t  is more difficult for the Japanese, 
since their standard of l i v i n ~  is higher and they requirc a bigher 
rate of pmfit. OP the other hand the Chinese dso have tbeir 
weak pints. They obtain goods of eta inferior quality and, on 
the other hand, they have to pay at Ieast ro per cent. more &an 
the Japanese. They have to pay 2.70 yen more than the Japanme 
for ebry ton of goods, but in spite a£ this they successfully corn- 
pete against our merchants in Manchuria, This speaks clearly 
enough of the incompetence of our people, The mere thought 
of this is horrifying. Tbe Chinese is hdt entirely to bimself and 
is given no help by the Government. The Japanese, Living in 
Manchuria, is protected by his own Government and afforded 1%- 
term credits at an insignificant rate of interest. W e  should thew 
fore organise an export ccwperative society for trade witb China. 
I t  should have specid facilities on steamers and on the South 
Manchurian Railway, and the Huandun Government should afford 
it credits at a low rate of interest. W e  shall then be able to 
compete successfully with the Chinese merchants, develop our own 
industry in Manchuria and export our goods to alI parts of the 
world. I 
The first step towards gaining control, financia1 and mercantile, 
in Manchuria and Mongolia mnsistg in obtaining the monopoly of 
the sale of the products of these countries. W e  must have ttie 
monopoly rights on the sale of Mongolian and Manchurian p m  
ducts, b a u s e  0~1y  in this case shall we be able to p s u e  oui 
t continend &, v e n t  the penetration of Amerieaa capital a d  undermine the inftmce of the Chinese m& Although Manchurian a d  Moqoliian goah must pam tb 3 three ports-Daim, I d m i  and M ~ e v e r t h d s s h i  Daben IS most important is the given me.  There is an a n n d  trafffc of 
7 , ~  V ~ S  through tbQ port witb r -1 of I I,*$- 
T h s   amount^ to p per ant of the total Mmchurb md 
Mongolian t d e .  From this port Meen diffemmt steamship linm 
diverge. The majority of these h%s seme the ooasa &wing. 
W e  control ail the tmnspwt system of Wmchutia aad Mo-k 
We may even obtain the monopoly of the srrle of s p d d  
Manchurian p~~ In tbis case tffe about6 be able to develop 
our mma W s p o r t  and force the NiM and Ma pwts into 
the background We should mntd the trade d mmmms q- 
ti* of kam, widely consumed in Central and South Ghh.  Tht 
Chin- use vegetable oil in their f a d ,  and in of war we 
a u l d  cut fbm IS fmm their supply of ofi and thy WUM suffer 
cmsidembly. With the control d their source d fo&W& 
z t h e  vansp~n we muld develop our ow preductio. of Aa, 
iacrease the amopnt of fertilisers obtahd in the fwm d by- 
produets from Fu&m 6 Thus all the agricultum of C h h  
w d d  be dependent upm us. In caae of war we &odd plaee an 
e g a  upw futiltsers snd prohibit their import to & r i d  rrnd 
South China This muld considumbly 4 the output of 
EoodstwEs by Ch- W e  ahodd not forget this side of the q u e  
in buitdhg up our continental Empire. Neither &odd we 
forget that Ewqw at~d A m 6  dso need enormaus gueplias of 
beans fot the purpase of f e d i s a h .  When we h o m e  the 
L ~ o p a 1 ' ~ o f t h ~ p r o d ~ ~ ~ ~ Z b e ~ b o t b a n  
I lami and dn sea, thm mumries requiring Q e  specid pducts of 
I Rdaachutia md Mcmgofia dl seek ow #avow. Wa must gain 
P control of the wbo1e syir~ua, of C order ho. obtain 
mampdy of tmde in him&& and M m g d h  Oaly than aan 
we suppmss the Cbinm merchant 
~awevsr,  the ~ h ~ e s e  are ~earniag fiom our exampIt 
bitting our trade w k l ~  their own met- We have not * 1-4 b compete 9uccewhliy e n s t  them in rhe a b v ~ t a b l e d s a a d i a t h c s p h a r e o f ~ ~  
ship)). Having built up a new system of t r m m ,  we d d  be 
M e  te pursue a doubleedged policy. On the one h a d  we abwId 
dndcavw1c M rn thaZ the Japanese Earn from the ergexZaree of 
thChmecreiathisbusine~is. AtthesametimeweshtiddPotallow 
the C W  to learn ( ~ f f  industrid d&. PrdoWy we W 
& c b r i ~  in M d u r i a  and Mongolia near to the so- of raw 
mat&& Tbs Chinese were: thus dvea tbe oppwtdtq. of &%- 
~ r h g a u t s ~ a a d ~ ~ r o w a f a d e s w h c h m m -  
,- 
p e i d  with .ow o m .  We must therefme sead our raw mate&& 
I to Japm aad work them up there, &&I ewporting td#m .tra 
China and other countries in the form of manufactured e s .  
W e  should thus give work to our own unemployed, hold back the 
influx of Chinese into Manchuria and Mongolia, and deprive the 
Chinese of the chance of copying our new industrial methods The 
iron obtained in f ensih and Anshaw, as well as the Fushua d 
would also be sent to China for final working up. 
W this speaks of the necessity of developing our ocean trans- 
port. W e  must extend the Dairen Company "Kizen ah" 
and our Government must atrord it a loan through the South 
Manchurian Railway Company, at a high rate of interest. Nw$ 
year wc shall recave 50,- tonnage for our wean transm 
d This is quite sufficient to enable us to occupy a dominating position 4 in trade with the Far East. O n  the one hand we have the South Mmchuriaa R Jlway which guarantees our transport on the Iand, and on the other hand we h v e  the control of an enonnous amount 
o€ Manchurian and Mongolian products waiting for transport. 
The iron laws of emnomics guarantee us success if we extend o u r  
ocean transport from Dairen as the central port. 
THIB GOLD STANDARD IS ESSEMTlM.. 
In spite of the fact that Manchuria and Mongolia are within the 
sphere of our activities, the main currency there is silver, This 
brings a b u t  a partial contradiction with our gold standard and 
reacts unfavourably upon our interests. If Japanese living in 
these regions have not become wealthy, it is exdusively because 
the silver money system is in operation there. The Chinese 
stubbornly maintain the silver standard and we minot, therefore, 
establish our plans for colonisation on a firm Bcorromic basis. We 
sustailr Iosses as follow as a result ;- 
1. W e  carry money Into Manchuria, based on the gold stan- 
dard. Them we have to exchange it for Chinese saver dollars. 
The exchange rate of the dollar frequently fluctuates as much as 
20 per cent, causing heavy losses to our people living in 
Manchuria, Speculation is  a common occupation and the invest- 
ment d capital becoma a sort of gama If a person invests 
200,oao yen in business, he may discuver one h e  day that his 
mpital has fakn to r&,ooo or xso,ooo dollars (Chinese) as a 
result of the fall in the exchange rate of the silver money. Con- 
sequently we bave s e v d  - of bankruptcy. 
a. The Chinese merchant makes use exclusivdy of silver 
mwey, and therefore suffers no losses from the fluctuations in the 
exchange rare. AIthougb the Chinese have no exact idea of the 
exchange value of gold and silver, they always win k aU forms 
of business. This is a natural gift of theirs, and we suffer &om 
it. We suffer losses although we are supported by the banks. 
As a result of the imperfect money system, the population of 
Central and South China buy their beans excIusively from the 
Cbincse. Here w e  can do notbing, and must therefore conquer 
the whde of China. 

Manchuria and Mongolia according to our awn pIaas. W e  would 
thus allay international suspicions, clear the m d  for broader p b  
and compel the Powers to recognise the fact of our special position 
in this country. W e  should welcome aU do& on the part of the 
Powers to invest their apital, but we must not d o w  China to 
do business with the large Powers as it would like to do. Smce 
we wish the Powers to reoagnise our special position in Manchuria 
and Mongolia both in the political and economic sense, we s h d  
be compelled to interfere and to carry all the weight of responsi- 
bility, together with C h .  W e  must endearnut to ensure that 
our policy expands to take in also the diplomatic relations of 
China witb other countries. 
THE NBIBI) TO MODfPY THE ORGANISATION OF THE SOUTH 
WCUURIILN RmWAY.  
The South Mmchuriau Railway Company functions ia 
Manchuria like the Korean Governor-GeaemI in the face of ma- 
tions, If we want to build our new continental Empire, we shwld 
change the whole organisation of the company and remove the 
cliffidties with which we haw to fight, The functions of the 
company are many-sided. Every &age in the Cabinet causes 
chauges in tbe administration of the South Man&+sn Railway 
and on the other hand the activities of the railway influence the 
Cabinet to a considerable extent. The point is that the South 
Manchurian Railway is semi- governmental. The Powers there- 
fore consider this  railway more in the nature of a political organ 
than a commercial enterprise. As soon as measures are hkm 
for the dwelapment of Manchuria and Mongolia, the Powers turn 
to the Nine Powers Agreement in order to smasb tbe plans of the 
South Manchurian Railway. This has considerably banned our 
interests. The South Manchurian Railway is under four-fold 
control : the contrd of the Huandun Governor, the Supreme Repre- 
sentative of the authorities in Dairen, the h e r d  Consul in 
Mukden and, finally, the Pt~sident of the railway itself. These 
four plenipotentiaries have to exchange opinions in Daircn before 
the railway company can take any important steps. Although 
their meebngs take place behind closed doon, nevertheless the 
Chinese powers of the Three Eastern Provinces learn a great deal. 
They do their utmost to prevent the Central Chinese authorities 
from giving the necessary permimioa for the putting through of 
new measures, and, m o w e r ,  Al the decisions of the milway 
company have to receive the consent of the Ministry for Foreign 
Mairs, the Ministry of Transport, the War Ministry, and the 
Ministry of F i i c a  If one of these four ministries refuses to 
approve the decisions, then the rdway company is p e r l e s s  to 
act. Because of this, our present Premier, although he tacogniwa 
his failures, nevertheless has taken upon himself the reqmdbili- 
- ties of Minister of Foreign Affairs. Constquently we can mark 
Id 
asily kaep oar p h s  in Manchuria a secret, and we a put them 
tbmugh with despatch and determination. The !501lth Man- 
churian Railway therefore must be reorganiged. W under- 
Wings belonging to the railway must be cr*lver€ed into 
independent companies under the leadership of the South 
Manchurian Railway. W e  can then take decisive measures for 
the conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia. On the other hand, ' we must make the proposition to the Chinese, Europeans and 
Americans, that they invest their money in the South Manchurian 
Railway on condition that the majority of the bands remain in 
oktr bands. The control of the raiIway will then remain with us, 
and we shall bt able with even greater energy to carry out our 
imperial mission. In inviting other Powers to take part in the 
development of the South Manchurian Railway, we shall deceive 
the whole world. Having done this, we shall mow forward into 
Manchuria and Mongolia, free ourselves from the limitations of 
aht Nhe Powers Agreement and s-gtben our d v i t i e s  witb 
the hdp of foreign capital. 
C 
The fuIlowing are large undertakings belonging to the South 
M a n d a h  Railway :- 
t. Ilaow A m  STEEL. 
Iron md steel are closely connected with our national develop- 
ment. Howwer, as a result of the la& of ore, we cannot d v e  
this problem. Up to now we have been coaaplled to import 
steel from the Yaagtze Valley and the Malay Peninsula. The 
rn i a ~ g a t i o ~ s  of our General Headquarters show, bowmu, 
that there are rich deposits of iron in Manchuria and MW- 
h d h g  to the most modest accounts tberie are xo billion tons 
of imn there. At first, when technique was not so highly 
developed, tbe Anshan iron and steel work had an loss of 
3 millinn yen. later, when new methods were worked out, &is 
W t  became amaller. In 1ga6 it was equal to no more than 
ISO,"O, and a year lafer the works were giving a p d t  of 
8m,ooa yen. If the Martin furnace is overhauled, we shall make 
no less than q millton anndy.  The quality of the iron h m  
Pensih is exceltent. This iron together with the Onsban ore will 
make us independent in the sphere of iron and steel supplies. 
The deposits of iron in Manchuria and Mongolii are equal to 
approximately I,- milliun tons ; those of cod 2,s- million tons. 
Tbia deposit of 4 is sufficient to supply the reg-ts of the 
deposits of iron om With these enormous supplies of iron and 
cad in our hands, we shaU be completely independent for a period 
nf at least seventy Reckoning xm dollars p d t  on m e  ton 
of rta l ,  we rhall & able to make a profit of 35.- million yen 
on 350 million tuna of st&. W e  shall ewnomise rao million yen, 
whicb we pay annuollly for imported steef. We have suikieat 
iron and st& fw our industry, we shall become the leading d : : 
Power, and wiIl be able to conquer East and West. For -4 
-: 1 
3= 
purpose the metal works mwt be separated from tbe Swth 
Manchurian Railway. 
2. Oa. 
Another commodity of enormous importance of which we have 
a deficit is kmsena. It is esssentid for the life of the nation. 
Fortunately there are 5,- milIim tons of raw oil h tbe d* 
mines of Fushun from which 6 per cent. dined oil csn be obtained 
both for automobiles and for steamships. At present Japan 
imports ?-,ow tons of oit m u a l l y  at a cost of 60 d h  yen. 
As the Fusbun mines have 50 billion tons of refined oil, w~ can, at 
,the rate of 5 per cenL, obtain 250 miltion tms d best ad, and if 
we raise the percentage to g, then we can obtain 450 million tws. 
W e  can obtain an average of 350 milion tons. W e  mn obtain 
an average of 350 maion twa Reckoning at the rate of 15 yen 
per ton, the Fushuu oil wiU give us a,aso million yen. This will 
be a great industrial redutton for us. Oil is the great factor 
from the point of vim of national defence and national wealth. 
Our army and fleet will be invincible fortresses if we have the iron 
and oil of Mmcbh. Without doubt Manchuria and Mongdia 
aue the heart of our Empire. 
Am'cultarrd fdlisws. Ammonia d p h a t e  and 0th- P ~ ~ d t r c t j ,  
For the pduction of footstuffs, agricultural fertilisers are 
essential. Ammonia sulphate can be obtained from coal for 
&emid fertiIisatiaa. The Fushun coal is particdarly rich in 
this respect. At present we use 500,ooo tons of ammo 'a aulphate. 
Half of this mount we work up in Japan, using the #, shlan and 
Fushun cod. The other half we have to '=port from abroad qt 
the cost of 35 million yen m year. As our agriculture is gmwirg 
and we intend developing out new Empire in Manchuria and 
Mongolia, we shall require a miIlion tons of ammonia sdphate 
annually during the next ten years, Fnwn the by-prodltcb 
obtained by burning Fushun coal during the smelting of steel, 
we can obtain an ea~mous  amount of ammcmir sulphate, If we 
work up 3m,000 tons annually, we s b d  increase our annual 
income by more than 90 million yen. This will 've a totsll of 
*,ow million )en in the course of 8fty years. # ts money can 
be used to raise our agricdture, and if there is a balance, we an 
buy fettilising manures and supply all the agricultural undertak- 
ings throughout China and the South Sea Islands. This busin- 
must also be separated from the South Manchurian Railway, 
and we shall then have complete contro1 over the fertilising 
materials throughout the Far East. 
We rue importing ~oo,oao tons of soda at a cost of over xo 
million yen annually, Both soda and Yoda ash are essential for 
military and industrial purpopes. Soda is obtained fmm d t  and 
cod, which are to be found in abundance in Manchuria and 
MongoIia. If we take up this w k  we shaU be able to satisfy 
the requirements not only of Japan but will be able to d to 
Wna and obtain the monopoly of this branch d industry. W e  
s b d d  gain a pr&t of m less than r$ million yen annually. Tbk I d 
s h a d  also be removed from tlie control of the Soutb Manchurian I Railway* I 
MAGNBSXA AND ALUYIMIUM. 
. According to information of the South Manchurian W w a y  
and the assertions of Dr. Hont from the Tohdru University, there 
is an abundanw of aluminium and magnesia in Manchuria. . 
m e d a  is to be found in the neighbourhd of Tasbicbaw, 
rduminium dose h Enmi. Here are the largest deposits in the 
world, A ton of magnesia costs z,ooo yen and aluminium 1,- 
The tatal value of the deposits of these mine* in Man&& k 
750 million yen. These minwds are &culady useful for the 
manufacture of aeroplanes, medical k.~timmts, ships, etc. 
T b m  are large d e p i t s  oalp in the U d t d  S@tes of America. 
Thest metals are becoming more and mom enwtial everg day 
and the supply is continually falling. The g r h  rise rapidly, 
The depdts on our territory in Manchuria and M a g d a  are the 
gift of G d  They are essential for our industry and nations1 
I 
defence ; and this industry also must be made ihdependmt of the 
South Manchurian Railway. The metals must be -Iced up in 
Japan in order that the Fengtien Government may not q y  cnsr 
1 
methods, and also to ensure that British and A m e r b m  mphd 
haye no oppnrhmity of observing our p m  Ha adzed 
these deposits in tbe Thm Eastern Provinces, we &% use 
the watw-power of the River Yalu to work it up. As avl& is 
continually developing, the whole world would in the future a@y 
to us for materials for aeroplane coastwction. 
If all these undertaki  are independent of each other, they 
wiU be able to progress rapidly and give us no less than h b i l l k  
yen p d t  annually. The industrial ddoprnmt of South 
Manchuiia k of enormous importance for our national defence and 
ecoaomic development. It will lay the fuundatioos of our indus- 
trial Empire, As for cultural institutions like hospitals, scbaoIa 
and so on, they are the beralds of our progress in Manchuria and 
Mongolia. They will raise our prestige and auWity. They 
must be separated h m  the South Mwcburiaa Railway in order 
that they may double our p v e r  in moving into North Mancburh. 
When these big undertakings h o m e  independat and fteed 
ftom the intedemnce of our oBcials, they will of course become 
centres of arttional pmsperity. W e  shall rapidly move forward 
on the wings of economic development, witbwt  arousing tbe as- 
picions of ?he Powers and without d i n g  forth anti-Jay- 
acthidehi among the population of the Three Eaaterxl Pmmes. 
Wlth the help of these drcumspect methods, we can create om 
new continental Empire. 
Farei loans afforged to the South Ma 
& u d G  tho% rdways alone which are 
remaining railways built us, but nomi 
I 
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of China, may be mdgamattd with the frnished railways, or r?ap 
be made independent, according to the desires of the investmg 
Powers. The slogan of "equal cbances" will give us the oppor- 
tunity of getting foreign lans and allaying all suspicion as regards 
our intentions in N o d  Manchuria. In any case, foreign capital 
will be required by us for developing our continental Empire. 
When the foreign Powers are given the opportunity of investing 
their capital in the South Manchurian Railway, they will gladly 
give us more money and China will be able to do nothing against 
it, This is the best way of developing our plans in Mancburia. 
We must lose no time, but must take up the same line with regard 
to the riches mncentratecl in North Manchuria and Mongolia. We 
must convert the new roads from Kitin to Hoiren and from Chan- 
shun to Dalai into separate undertakings, as well as the t i m k  
and mining undertakings. 
The exploitation of North Manchuria will considerably enrich 
the Manchurian Railway. W e  must permit foreign Powers to 
invest their money in the South Manchurian Railway and to receive 
their t a r e  d the profits. When they begin to receive pro&, 
they will cease to hinder our activities in Manchuria. Enomoris 
masses of Chinese are migrating into South Manchuria.. Their 
position will become stronger every day. The position of our 
immigrants ir becoming gradually worse, since the right to rent 
Imd is.not yet fully safeguarded inside the country. Even with 
the support of our Government, they cannot campet with the 
Cbinese, whose standard of living is lower. Our only chance is  
to beat the Chinese by investing considet.able sums of money. But 
to do this, we need foreign loans. The wealth of North Man- 
churia must be joined up with our forces in South Manchuria, 
and the problem will be immediately solved once and for dl. If 
we fail in this task, they will be able to hold out in North Man- 
rhuria and will provide us with foodstuffs and raw materials. As 
the interests of Nortb Manchuria and Japan are closely connected, 
we must immediately enter North Manchuria and pursue our policy 
there. 
WE MUST W R M  A COLONIAL DEPARTMENT. 
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P m d y ,  1 consider that 2 the ab~rption of ~ d d  not 
be cam4 out during the time when Ib held smy, it was h u s a  
of Jack Bf a, specid organ of mntral. As a rusult there was 
m t  &&ereace of opinion and it was impossihk to pursue our 
mt Wcy. 'This opened up the way for iatemathal obstmcs 
tion and Rcrr-n oppodtion. Masses of propagandists arrived in 
Gurdpe+ Axntarica and a r e a  and dmhred that we rmgdse the 
independence of Korea and have no cla~rn on her territory. Aa 
a result it was possi'ble for us to retrieve international wnfidenct 
ong w e .  If we create a calanial &partmeat as though for 
Formosa, we shall p i n  our: ends. It is quite d&c that a special 
iastitutirn ir required for the development of mloahrion and 
'tmmigratioa. The creation of the new Empire irt Wagolia and 
Manelm& is of enormous importaace for the existence of J a w ,  
There must be a special colanial department in arder to control our 
poIig wer this enormous territory direct from Tokio. Qur &ci& 
there must medy accept our opders, but must not interfere 
arb'hriiy in the puisuana of out paiicy. This will safeguard 
tht proper s&creq is reserved and hostile nations will be unable 
t~ dismver oiir secrets concerning Our colonial activides. I n k -  
mtiond puMc opinion wilt not then ke,abIe to f&w our meve- 
mats in Mongolia md Manchuria and we shall not have to farr 
their interference. 
As ifoi our! undwakings bn the Soutb Manchurian R-y, 
like the & l a p e n t :  Society, the Land Society, the Trust Com- 
pany, e t ~ ,  control of these aedexbldn s h d d  be in the hsq& 
of the cotmi J deprtment. They s h u  $ all be under united con- 
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trol for the purpose ul helping u l  in the policy of e x p i o n  in 
Mongulk and Manchuria, wbich is being pursued by h e  Imperial 
Government, ant1 thus assist in the building up of the new Empire. 
TWI VALLEY OF THE TAWW YlVER ON THE PBWMWDBN RAILWAY. 
The valley of the TaIin Kiver is an enormous, sparsel popu- 
lated territory. The place seethes with bandits. Many zirrans 
have placed investments here, especially in the rice p l a n t a ~ r .  
The district gives promise of becomlag a nourishing centre. 
Furthermore, it is easy to move forward into the Sbechea district 
from here. W e  must do our utmost to defend our Koreans and 
then use the first available opportunity of obtaining the r-aht to 
colonist this district from China. Our immigrants must obtain 
an opportunity of living here and playing as our vanguard h the 
advance upon Shcches and Mongolia. In case of war this mlley 
will be a strategical point for the large armies. W e  &dl then 
be able not only to prevent the Chinese from mwhg north, but 
will rule over the enormous riches in South Manchuria. 11 the 
Koreans come to this district we must offer them financial suppwt 
through our trust mieties and other fmncial o r g a h o n s .  
These organisations must have property rights, and the-Koreans 
will be limited to the right to work upon the land. Formally, 
however, the Koreans must have property rights. T h  we tan 
obtain these rights from the Chinese Government. The trust 
societies and financial organs must fully support our Korean sub 
jects in their efforts to obtain land. If they need money to buy 
bwl, the financial organs must help them. W e  shall thus, un- 
noticed, gain the control of the best rite plantations which w r  
immigrants, i.e., the Japanese, must receive. They will have to 
(lisplace the Koreans who, in their turn, will seek new lands wbicb, ' 
in the future, will also come into the hands of our psoplc. This 
is our policy in the work of mlonisin the rice and bean planta- 
tions. As for cattle-breeding, the %evdopment Society must 
reccive +a1 powers and phce hrge herds at ?he disposal of our 
country, This society must engage in horse-breeding, choosing 
the bmt Mongolian horses for the purpose of national dehnce b 
Japan. 
T W  STRUGGLE AGAINST CAINBSB lMMIGRAl?m. 
The internal contiicts in China have forced an enormous t w n k  
of Chinese of late to settle down in Mongolia and8 M u r i a .  
This bas formed a great menace to our immigAonh We must 
bere take the corresponding measures. The fact Yhat the -st 
Government welooma this hmigmtion and a measurer 
against it, is a serious menace to our own i m r n i g t a h  d 
known American specialist on China declared tbat the 
owners are pursuing such a fine policy that everybody is settling 
down on its territory. Thus the influx of immignmts is r# I 
as a sign of the energetic policy of the Mukden authorities. Thb 
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